The changes in international politics caused change in foreign policies of the states. The governments of many countries began to develop foreign policies to alliances and relations. According to with the "Look to the Iranian government, the East" can serve Iran's national interests and can break dependence on the West and balanced foreign policy problems: political isolation logical isolation. These are caused by Iran's foreign policy; Iran has rejected the prevailing norms of the international system and the regional dynamics. The immediate consequences are: political showdown with the West particularly the U.S. and in the region tensions have increased with the neighbors. At the same time Iran heavily relies on its oil and gas revenue to achieve an economic growth. At this time when Iran is facing increasing international isolation, "Look to the East" policy can serve as fine recipe for its stagnated oil business and the Asian nations. Iranian state is looking proactively towards the Asian Countries especially India. Iran's foreign policy raises many unanswered questions. The objectives of study to provide an account and assessment of Iran's relations with the outside world within these new systemic conditions and account of Iran's relations with the rest of the world will be preceded by a brief historical account of these relations. The study tries to highlight about Iran's foreign policy? How does Iran define its interests and choose to pursue them? Is this a matter to be explained or to be understood? Is its foreign policy based on words or deeds, behavior or action?
Background of Iranian Foreign Policy
A major way in which foreign policy today serves a country's interest by contributing to its economic and social progress. This has made foreign policy increasingly development-oriented. Iranian foreign policy under Ahmadinejad has proved to be a constant source of tension on both the regional and international levels. In a very direct fashion, the rapid political developments in the domestic arena have spilled over into Iran's foreign policy and regional relations. Questions about Ahmadinejad's foreign policy decision-making are of course valid, but the complexity of decision-making in Iran and the relationship between its powers centers could easily lead to a misunderstanding of the Iranian political system.
There is little doubt that Iranian foreign policy-makers have carefully taken into account their geopolitical environment at both the regional and global levels and have since 1979 been able to defend Iran's national security interests in war and peace. Khomeini's acceptance of the ceasefire with Iraq in 1988 had as much to do with the protection of Iran's territorial integrity as it did, in his words, with 'the survival of the revolution'. Whether during the eight years of defensive war against Iraq or in the face of American and Israeli military threats, national security interests have been given the highest priority, even at the expense of domestic freedoms. The same is the case with some other nations, weak or strong. In the United States, for example, many Americans have become concerned that the Bush administration's overwhelming emphasis on national security and military power since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 is threatening their civil liberties. (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2012) 
Theoretical Approach
Given that all observations are selective and theory-laden, one can only explain Iranian foreign policy by the ass.ccsenet.org Asian Social Science Vol. 13, No. 6 2017 theoretical approach of international relations (IR) . Scholarly debates about theory in IR since its inception after the Second World War have generally been concerned with providing a reliable instrument for watching international events, including those in the Middle East and Iran's behavior. Improvements in this interdisciplinary have taken place through epistemological, ontological and methodological debates. In one debate, traditionalism was methodologically challenged by behaviouralism, but behaviouralism failed to answer many questions and was replaced by post behaviouralism. The revival of realism by neo-realists led to a new debate with neoliberalism in IR. In the ongoing debate between rationalists, including both neoliberals and neo-realists, and constructivists, different perspectives of ontology and epistemology are discussed. 'Neorealist see the structure of the international system as a distribution of material capabilities . . . Neoliberals see it as capabilities plus institutions . . . and constructivists see it as a distribution of ideas.
Entering these debates in IR, constructivists, on the one hand, believe in 'ideas all the way down'. International politics, in their view, is in the process of being made all the time. They believe in 'understanding' states' actions (not behavior) because they are intentional. On the Other hand, rationalists assume the interest and power of states to be 'exogenously given' variables. That is why they claim to 'explain' states' behavior and are known as rationalists. They include ideational variables in their theories though juxtaposing them to material variables and assuming causal relations between them, i.e. a state's identity causes its national interests. But these relations in constructivist theories are 'constitutive', i.e. national interests are constituted by national identity. In giving precedence to structural constraints over the states strategies and motivations, neorealist shuns the classical realism's use of often essentialist concepts such as human nature to explain international politics. 
The Geopolitical Approach
Iran's confrontational policy in the 1980s that left it with only one major ally in the Middle East, which was Syria. Three geopolitical determinants help to provide a deeper explanation of Iran's predicament. First, Iran has a strong sense of identity, a notable culture and an ancient civilization from which it takes inspiration. 42 Second, Iran's interest in the affairs of oppressed nations worldwide is based on its civilization, which goes back to the pre-Islamic period. 43 Third, Iran is the only Shia Muslim state in the world, and this has heightened both its sense of uniqueness and its sense of isolation.
These historical 'facts' explain, individually and collectively, Iran's behavior to a large extent. Thus its egalitarian foreign policy can be explained in the light of its civilizational background and its pragmatism can be understood as a consequence of its experience of long-term governance. But a geopolitical approach is limited by the lack of definition in these historical 'facts', many of which are more recent than is usually imagined. 45 Therefore, compared to the impact of, for example, Shiism on Iran's foreign policy, one may find facts about the early Iran more reliable. (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2012) 
Two different roles in Iran's Foreign Policy: Hawk in the Middle East and Dove in Central Asia
When we look at the foreign policy practices of Iran, leaving aside the theocratic and idealist rhetoric in foreign policy, we see two different Iran's ran in the Middle East, another Iran in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Iran behaving like a "hawk" and remembering its constitutional mission when the problem is related to the Middle East, is playing a "dove" role with peaceful rhetoric leaving aside its constitutional mission when the issue in evolves problems in Central Asia and the Caucasus. By considering the historical Persian-Arab competition, to Iran, there is instrument of foreign policy more effective than religion in the Middle East. The Tehran that knows this reality exists in the Middle East through its policy on theocratic rhetoric, which considers problems in the region such as Western hegemony, authoritarian secular regimes, and problems based on Israel. This approach is rather rational for Iran. Indeed, Iran is trying to involve itself in Middle Eastern affairs by supporting Shies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Sunni Hamas in Palestine. In this respect, the Middle East is dealing with problems that create an opportunity for Iran to be effective in this region.
Iran also acts as a state pursuing national interests rather than an idealistic and Islamic state in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the Negron-Karabakh conflict, Caucasian and Central Asian problems which emerged after the end of the Cold War, especially Chechnya, Iran conducts foreign policy based on national interest, forgetting its idealism relied on religion in the constitution. Tehran carefully stays away from the acts disturbing Russia, which Iran needs in the interactional arena. As a result, for this aim, an Islamic and idealistic Iran does not differentiate its "Muslim brothers" such as Azerbaijanis and Chechens from Armenians. (Sahin, 2012) 
India -Iran Relations and Growing Strategic Interests
In the early 1900 s both countries started reordering their foreign policy priorities in the context of changed international milieu. This imperative brought the indo Iranian interests to coverage a number of issues impacting ass.ccsenet.org Asian Social Science Vol. 13, No. 6 2017 their strategic environment. (Sujata, India Iran Relations: Progress Problems and Prospects, 2016 ) India also shares with Iran an interest in stable political and economic order region where many countries, including the US and China, have evinced a keen interest, especially since it has become a major oil-producing region. Also, India and Iran are equally threatened by the men-aces of drug trafficking, smuggling in of small arms, and organized crime, all emanating largely from central Asia" stability in Central Asia and managing great-power relationships in the region. There is a clear strategic convergence between India and Iran on promoting stability in Central Asia and managing great-power relationships in the region". It is significant to note that during Khatami's visit, India and Iran agreed to intensify collaboration on transport projects that could link India with the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Europe. India is to cooperate with Iran in the development of a new port complex at Chah Bahar on the coast of Iran that could become India's gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. An-other project involves linking Chah Bahar port to the Iranian rail network, which is well connected to Central Asia and Europe. What is significant about these projects is that Pakistan will become marginal to India's relationship with the Central Asian region. As a result, India's relations with Central Asia will no longer be hostage to Islamabad's policies. (Pant, 2004) More oil production required foreign investment and the government had to embark on reforms in both domestic as well as foreign policies. However this policy has changed since Mahmood Ahmdinajad's government has followed radicalism in its foreign policy towards the western countries. The policy has brought the Islamic republic back to the era of Ayatullah khomini when most countries in and outside the region condemn the changing Iranian Policy. To understand the reason for Iran's shift from reformism to radicalism, it can be argued that although Ahmadinejad and radical groups have been and supported by centers of power inside the country particularly Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, supreme leader of Iran, high oil prices have played a key role in empowering him to push ahead with his polices. The total oil income for Iran in the first half of 2008 was $54billion, only billion shy its oil income of $57 billion for the entire 2007 This has helped Ahmadinejad government to follow his policy towards Asian countries. (Zahirinejad, 2010) 
Iran Europe Relations
Relations between Iran and Europe developed rapidly after 1990 under the pragmatist presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, and although tense at times, the relationship largely remained steady. However with the rise of Ahmadinejad to power in 2005 and his uncompromising position over Iran's nuclear activities as well as his unwise comments on subjects such as the Holocaust, this relative stability in relations has been significantly damaged, with major EU countries now tilting more towards the US approach to Iran. The current deadlock in negotiations with EU-3 (Germany, France and Great Britain), coupled with increasing accusations from American forces that Iran is supporting militant groups in Iraq, has undermined the relationship between Iran and Europe, which has been further damaged by European support for UN Security Council sanctions against Iran.
The period of 1990-2005 was of great importance for Iran's relations with Europe. 1990 coincided with the end of the war with Iraq and the collapse of communism in 2005 that followed after terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in United States including regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which have had a huge impact on Iran and its environment. Moreover, Iran has missed opportunities to resolve its disputes with the United States at those times when the United States was in need of Iranian cooperation, while approaching the United States when its help was no longer needed. Iran's inability to define its role in the post-Soviet world in a more positive manner, such as becoming the representative of a more democratic and progressive Islam, has kept it trapped in the outdated Cold War mold of international relations and reduced its ability to deal effectively with the United States. (Hunter , 2010) In the aftermath of 11 September, Iran turned more than ever towards Europe, as it felt that the level of danger posed by the United States and its policies for the greater Middle East had increased dramatically. Those policies had moved beyond containment and now included the possibility of pre-emptive attacks and regime change. 
Iran -Pakistan Relations
Challenges and demands of regional politics as well as those of the global environment have influenced the policies of both countries ¡n a similar manner. In the early phase of their relationship, both countries faced problems of consolidation compounded by security needs and both aligned themselves with the United States in the Cold War era. Later, both grew disenchanted with their common ally and turned to mutual cooperation at the regional level. During the seventies the security needs of a dismembered Pakistan and regional ambitions of an economically powerful Iran altered the fundamental equation of relationship by creating a dependency of the former on the latter. Notwithstanding this, the two countries were brought in closer cooperation. "At present, the special relation-ship has found yet another locus stand; a growing quest for identity and policy in the religion and heritage of Islam. Another important factor external to the overall period of Pakistan-Iran relations is the geo-strategic position of Pakistan. The good neighborly relations also owe their origin to the geographical location of both Iran and Pakistan In an area crisscrossed by regional and global rivalries and competition. Pakistan is a Middle Eastern and a South Asian power, and "South Asia is a strategic transitional zone between West Asia and Southeast Asia. Events in South Asia have considerable impact on neighboring areas". Additionally, Pakistan itself plays the role of a 'transitional zone' by virtue of being both a South Asian and a Middle Eastern power. Thus Pakistan's stability is linked with the stability of the entire region". (Mohammadally, 1979) Pakistan was amongst the first few countries to endorse its recognition of the new regime in Tehran after the revolution in 1979. Regrettably, later events began to taint relations between the former allies. According to reliable sources, Pakistan and Iran had reached an understanding on nuclear cooperation somewhere in early 90s. The possibility of a shared defense treaty was too explored. Later, in 1991 during the stint of former COAS, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, both sides, it is said, had reached an accord for nuclear cooperation. In return, Iran was to provide conventional weapons and oil since at the time Pakistan was under Presser Amendment. Some quarters nonetheless maintain that the political authorities in Islamabad had refused any such move. It is claimed that President Ishaq sought PM Sharif's approval for the deal which was turned down by the latter. The deal was subsequently abandoned. (Khalid & Safdar, 2016) Indubitably, the Revolution in Iran, Zia's Islamization drive in Pakistan and Afghan war played a central role in destroying the relations between Tehran and Islamabad. General Zia's era was a major blow to the relations between the two countries. It created deep sectarian fissures in the society and raised the dreaded monster of religious extremism in Pakistan. Zia's policies fuelled anti-Shia hatred and fragmented the social fabric of the society (Ahmad, 2015)
Iran and China Relations and Attractions

Iran's Attraction to China Derives from the Following Factors
Iran's vast oil and gas reserve.
Substantial markets.
Iran's no ideological approach to China and regions of interest to it, such as Central Asia. For instance, Iran has not emphasized the Islamic factor in its relations with China and has refrained from supporting Chinese Muslims' grievances against Beijing. This attitude was best illustrated by Iran's near silence in the face of the harsh Chinese crackdown on its Muslim Uighur minority during riots that broke out in Urumqi in July 2009. This official attitude generated comments in the Iranian media, especially among those opposed to the government's ideological approach to other foreign policy issues, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, at the expense of Iran's national interests. 15 This Iranian attitude is in sharp contrast to that of some elements in the West who are supportive of such groups. Some in the West would not even mind China's territorial disintegration.
Mutual commitment to the territorial status quo and opposition to secessionist movements.
Absence of any Iranian preconditions for better ties.
In its relations with China, Iran has not imposed any prior political conditions, as it has done in the case of the United States. Thus, while Iran has cited close U.S.-Israeli ties as one reason for not having relations with America, it has ignored Sino-Israeli relations, which include large Israeli arms sales to China.
China Is Attractive to Iran for the Following Reasons
It is a source of goods, services, technology and investment. This factor became more important after the failure of Iran's diplomacy of outreach to Europe and partially to the United States.
It is a potential strategic and political counterweight to the United States.
The lack of Chinese preconditions for better ties such as improved human rights performance or support for the Arab Israel peace.
It is a model of socioeconomic and political development.
There is a lack of any disagreements within the Iranian regime's key elements on having good relations with China. Because of these factors, throughout the 1990s and 2000s Sino-Iranian economic and political relations expanded, although the pace and scope of this expansion would have been more significant had it not been for the effects of other aspects of Iran's foreign policy, particularly its conflict with the United States. Even so, between September 1992 and June 2006, there were more than 15 high-level visits by Iranian and Chinese leaders to each other's countries, including by three Iranian presidents to China. 18 In addition, over the last two decades, the two countries have signed and implemented a number of important agreements in various fields. In February 1993, during the visit of the Chinese foreign minister to Tehran, the two sides signed an agreement for the construction of two 300-megawatt nuclear power plants. This agreement angered the United States, which, in response, impounded a Chinese cargo ship, accusing it of carrying chemical weapons to Iran. Sino-Iranian economic and technological cooperation became more difficult after the United States imposed economic sanctions on Iran. Initially, China opposed these sanctions and resisted American pressures to cancel its nuclear agreement with Iran. However, under U.S. pressure, in 1996 China declared that it would not construct the two nuclear power plants.
During the last decade, Sino-Iranian economic relations have been focused mainly on the energy sector, because of Iran's acute need for investments that are not forthcoming from Western sources. Meanwhile, China is keen to have a diversified and secure source of energy supplies. Consequently, in the last six years, China has become an important investor in Iran's energy sector. China has the key to triggering a halt to Iran's nuclear ambitions. As one of the only i United Nations Security Council members sharing an intimate relationship with that state, Beijing is the international community's most j viable link with Tehran. (Ong-Webb, 2009) 
Iran's Nuclear Program, Sanctions and the Threat
The history of Iran's quest for nuclear technology goes back to the mid-1950s. In 1957, Iran signed an agreement with the United States "for cooperation in research on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." Shortly afterwards, Iran established a Nuclear Research Center at Tehran University and purchased a small research reactor. Iran was among the first countries to sign and ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). However, it was only in the early 1970s that Iran began to talk of the need to develop nuclear power plants to produce electricity and to save its oil and gas reserves for industrial goals and export. At the time, Iran looked to the United States and Europe for required reactors, know-how, and fuel. Because, at the time, Iran was a close Western ally, the Shah's nuclear ambitions did not generate strong anxiety, although there was some suspicion that he might eventually want to acquire nuclear weapons. Later, according to the first director of Iran's atomic energy organization, Dr. Akbar Esteemed, the Carter administration had developed some concerns over Iran's plans, leading the Shah to send him to Washington in 1977 to dispel them. Work was begun on Iran's first nuclear plant began in 1978 by a German concern, Craftwork Union. Iran also joined EURODIF. All these ambitions were abandoned after the revolution and the Iran-Iraq War that followed. The Basher power plant, which at the time of the Iraqi attack was 80 percent complete, suffered serious damage. After the war, Iran asked the Germans to complete the power plant, but the German government opposed it. Finally in 1995, Russia, in the context of its 1992 agreement with Iran on comprehensive nuclear cooperation, took over the building of the plant.
The Shah was suspected of seeking nuclear weapons, but the United States and other Western powers, according to most observers, did not look with alarm at this prospect, although, as noted earlier, this view is disputed by the first director of Iran's atomic energy organization. Anxiety over Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions began as early as the 1980s. Consequently, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear-weapon capability became a cornerstone of the Clinton administration's Iran policy. However, Iran's nuclear pro-gram did not become a major issue in its relations with the United States and other Western countries until 2002. On August 14, 2002, the MEK declared that it had discovered that Iran was constructing one nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water reactor in Arak. The construction of these facilities, strictly speaking, did not amount to a violation of the NPT. Moreover, it seems that the IAEA and perhaps the intelligence services of Western countries, including the United States, knew about Iran's activities. Nevertheless, the fact that Iran had not formally informed the IAEA of these activities made them appear suspect. According to some reports, the director of the IAEA told reporters that "it would have been better if we had been informed earlier about the decision to build these facilities. In August 2009, Iran agreed to the inspection of its heavy water nuclear plant in Arak by the IAEA inspectors. In its August 2009 report, the director general of the IAEA recognized this and other signs of Iranian cooperation with the agency. It noted that "Iran has cooperated in improving safeguard measures at FEP [Fuel enrichment Plant] in Natanz." It also noted that the agency was able to continue to "verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran." However, the report also said that Iran had not implemented the Additional Protocol or the UNSC resolutions. (Hunter , 2010) 
Changing behavior of foreign policy of Iran
Moderate engagement would encourage Iran's collaboration with multilateral institutions, help its integration with the global trading system, and give it far stronger incentives to improve its behavior than has the containment policy. Moderate engagement would also bring the United States into closer alignment with its allies, decreasing friction and improving the chances for a more effective common approach. Meanwhile, moderate engagement would begin a gradual process of laying the groundwork for an eventual rapprochement once Iran's domestic political situation permits it to move forward. Many Iranians now recognize that the best way to secure their country's future is by making a positive contribution to international peace and security. A new U.S. policy would strengthen their hand, helping them do just that "Changes soon began to appear on the international front as well. In a 1998 interview on CNN, Khatami told a surprised world audience that he wanted to start breaking down "the wall of mistrust" that separated Iran from the United States. This statement was cautiously welcomed by much of the international community, which hoped that the positive changes being made inside Iran would eventually be reflected in the country's external policies. Meanwhile, the United States found that international support for the American containment policy was beginning to slip. As long as Iran had remained in the grip of revolutionary fervor, its extreme behavior helped justify U.S. policy. But once the new government reached out to the West, advocated detente with the United States, and called for democracy and the rule of law at home international perceptions began to change". (Talwar, 2001) 
Conclusion
In recent years, India and Iran have shown a determination to build a strong and cooperative relationship, drawing upon their historical, age-old cultural ties and geographical proximity, in response to the needs of a changing global and regional order. The rapidly shifting international environment and the concomitant strategic imperatives have been a major factor in forcing the two nations to reorient their foreign policies toward each other. President Khatami's visit to India in January 2003 further boosted ties and was a significant step toward bringing the two ancient civilizations closer. Much, however, needs to be done to provide a firm and substantial economic and political underpinning for a long-term strategic orientation to the bilateral relationship. Not only will stronger Indo-Iranian ties benefit the people of the two countries, but the trajectory of those relations will, to a large extent, determine the contours of regional peace and stability in the coming years. Finally, this bilateral relationship is far from being an "axis" against any third state, much less against the U.S., as it is viewed in some quarters. Recent events in Middle East have put Iran under severe stress, as it has to contend with the US being more or less in complete control of the surrounding region. Not only Iran's future, but also the stability and security of the Persian Gulf, will depend on how Iran negotiates its turbulent relationship with the sole superpower. India, on the other hand, is trying its best to improve its relationship with the S.; antagonizing Washington is not really an option for it states will have to undertake some deft diplomatic footwork to manage Both their bilateral relationship in an international order so completely dominated
